AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): The analysis, referring to the battles in southern Lebanon since 1982, states that the resistance over these years, relying on knowledge of the region's geography, planning, and a war of attrition, was able to continuously challenge the Zionist regime's army.
The author considers the Iqlim al-Tuffah area as an example of this process and emphasizes that the experience of past conflicts shows that the prolongation of battle and the increasing costs of military presence can gradually neutralize the initial superiority of the occupying army.
This report, reviewing the Battle of Al-Luwayzah and Jabal Safi in 1988, recalls that the Zionist regime's army, after about two years of planning and several stages of testing, also failed to achieve its objectives in its extensive operation.
Subsequently, the Battle of Maydoun in the same year is also presented as another example of resistance against a large-scale ground, artillery, and aerial attack by the Zionist regime; a battle that, according to this analysis, despite the extensive firepower, did not lead to the full realization of Israel's military objectives.
In another part of the analysis, the Al-Rayhan operation in 1999 is highlighted as an example of the resistance's capability to bypass security measures and carry out a multi-axis operation against Israeli forces.
The author also, citing a 2009 study by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), enumerates the most important problems of the Israeli army during its 15-year presence in southern Lebanon, including the inability to translate military superiority into victory, the vulnerability of fixed positions and military convoys, the ineffectiveness of technological and air superiority in ending resistance activities, and the increasing psychological and political costs of Israeli casualties.
In its conclusion, this analysis assesses Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 not as the result of a single military defeat, but as the result of the failure of a long-term security strategy to achieve its objectives.
According to this view, the resistance, relying on persistence and the attrition of the enemy's capability, was able to create an equation in which maintaining occupied areas became an increasingly costly burden for Israel, to the extent that the question of "how to protect the security belt?" ultimately changed to "how to get out of it?"
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